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Poetic Sensibilities, Humanities,  
and Wonder: Toward an E/Affective 
Sociology of Sport
Robert E. Rinehart
The following is the Presidential Address given to the North American Society for 
the Sociology of Sport annual meeting in Ottawa, Ontario, on November 6, 2009.1
The poet, using the skills that enable compression,  
packs a world into a tennis ball. The reader, 
through attentive reading, unpacks that world 
in a matter of moments. 
—Anne McCrary Sullivan, 2005, p. 25 
We are fascinated by the unit; 
only a unity seems rational to us. 
We scorn the senses, because  
their information reaches us in bursts. 
We scorn the groupings of the world,  
and we scorn those of our bodies.
 —Michel Serres, 1995 [1982], p. 2
In the academy that we often call the “sociology of sport,” rarely do we allow 
for the existence of poets or even of poetic sensibilities. This may seem to be a 
strange comment, given that NASSS particularly, and the sociology of sport more 
generally, are seen as stemming from a proud and mostly-honored tradition of the 
“social sciences.” In this case, the emphasis is on “sciences”—as opposed to more 
humanities-oriented discussions of the social.2 I plan, initially, to provide a con-
textualization of how I see we have come to where we are at, so please bear with 
me through my rehistoricizing, or story-making, of the sociology of sport—for, in 
my worldview, it is all story-making.
The emphasis on “science” by our forebears is not simply an issue of semantics, 
an innocent word choice, or an arbitrary choice between two poles of the humani-
ties and of the sciences. Nor is the simplistic binary that I have drawn—between 
the sciences and the humanities—even partially accurate, though we often look 
at humanities and the sciences as miles apart theoretically, epistemologically, 
ontologically. There are many who cross-pollinate, using, for example, multiple 
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methodologies to extract both descriptive and interpretive meanings out of their 
studies. There are those who encourage us to think with a “sociological imagina-
tion,” in so many different and changing ways (e.g., Mills, 1959; Thrift, 2008; 
Walk, 2006). To wit, Mills writes
To limit, in the name of “natural science,” the problems upon which we shall 
work seems to me a curious timidity. . . . The classic social analyst has avoided 
any rigid set of procedures; he [sic] has sought to develop and to use in his 
work the sociological imagination. (1959, p. 120)
Notice that C. Wright Mills is calling for neither a prescriptive nor a proscriptive 
answer regarding methodology: rather, he is proposing a more universal opening-up 
of method, a tendency toward—if he were familiar with the term—a “rhizomatic” 
approach (cf., Deleuze & Guattari, 1987), indeed, of worldview, to explore fresh 
and various ways of apprehending the ever-changing and wondrous world. And, 
of course, our apprehending and our making of these worlds through writing them 
into being are themselves active acts of wonder.
But, of course, it is ultimately up to us as individuals to grab the brass ring 
of imagination in what we do. Often, however, we do not: for example, if a series 
of poems were submitted, without explanation or “framing,” to the Sociology of 
Sport Journal, the International Review for the Sociology of Sport, or the Journal of 
Sport and Social Issues—for a non-“special issue” issue—would fiction or poetry 
be considered? The British journal Qualitative Research in Sport and Exercise may 
be the exception, but time will tell. Yet, Qualitative Inquiry and the International 
Review of Qualitative Research, as examples, routinely publish such affect-laden 
“performances,” unapologetically and often without “framing.” They encourage 
open texts with “meaning” that needs to be, like McCrary Sullivan’s tennis ball, 
actively unpacked by an imaginative reader.3
It seems to me that scholars whose fundamental unit and terrain are the body 
and the realm of sensory knowledge and understandings, values and affect, should 
be in the vanguard of exploratory work where exploration into and dissemination 
of value and affect are experimental—utilizing methods and lenses such as fiction 
or poetry. But, with a few exceptions, we really aren’t doing this. This is not simply 
a way or representation; it is also a worldview that captures a manner of thinking, 
a strategic creativity, a poetic sensibility.
I don’t think the problem of a lack of proactive stances in our “areas” of the 
body, physical culture, and contest as represented by our major journals, is just 
one of a twenty-year lag of the so-called “sub-discipline” of the sociology of sport 
behind the “parent disciplines” of, now, sociology, communications, media studies, 
geography, cultural studies, anthropology—and so forth. Because in those areas, 
scholars are willingly pushing for innovative ways of thinking and performing, seek-
ing new answers to old questions, posing different questions and finding interesting 
ways of approaching them. We, on the other hand, have largely become reactive, 
derivative of those within our so-called parent disciplines rather than innovative 
and experimental with our admittedly-unique subject areas.
Arguably, our “areas”—that is, the subject matters of the body, of how bodies 
adjust, resist, normalize, enjoy, grow, mortify, discipline, and present themselves 
in the presence and absence of other bodies—are rife with possibilities for novel 
and nuanced, experimental and experiential ways of discovering and uncovering 
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of meaning and understanding. We have every opportunity to explore, for example, 
what Heshusius calls “the tacit and somatic modes of knowing [that] all describe a 
nondescribable, nonaccountable form of knowing that is crucial and vital” (1994, 
p. 17).4 The expressions—and worldviews—stemming from poetry and poetic 
sensibilities are one way of approaching deep and vital ways of uncovering what 
it means to be human; to live our lives into existence; to understand, not simply 
know; to make sense of and be with the world.5
However, we—that is, “social scientists” who study sport—examine, mark, 
investigate, parse, and even discuss marginalized groups and individuals, but we 
often do it purposefully, in a very clinical, marginalizing way. By the very act of 
marking, we ourselves perform the acts of marginalization (cf., Montagu, 1997). We 
bring marginalization into being. By the very act of parsing, we ourselves objectify 
the body, tacitly (in some cases) agreeing to the premises of Cartesian dualities, to 
the limitations that exist when we examine whole and irreducible factors by means 
of appreciable variables. In a real sense, then, we bring body objectification into 
being. This is akin to the noncorporeal attribute described by Deleuze and Guattari 
(1987), “. . . one not representing or referring but intervening in a way; it is a speech 
act” (p. 96).6 By acceding to the very dominant terms and questions of things we 
study, we instantiate them, we validate them.
It is sometimes ironic that the goals many of us have, to somehow claim and 
envision a “better” world, however defined, are undermined by the unreflexive 
values we often bring to the work. I am not saying that we alone create margin-
alization or objectification, or certainly that we cause such stances to be, but that 
we work in tandem with other factors to legitimize such things as marginalization 
or objectification.
We examine class differences by first using, then reinforcing, and finally rei-
fying, the discrete, stratifying categories of class. We also have learned to create 
simplistic binaries—and sometimes complex explanations, which, when broken 
down, reduce to simplistic binaries—when life is not so clinical, so discrete, so 
easily broken down. And we call ourselves—some of us do—social scientists, as if 
to study anything but these easily-digestible variables is “non-scientific”—which, 
of course, it is. Or at least it is seen as such in the present historical moment.
But why have we privileged the science model over, for example, the humani-
ties model in our “sociology of sport” discourse?
The antecedents of this move are fairly clear, yet again, complex. They rest 
in mostly political intentions—yet the dances of scientific and cultural hegemony 
weave into the story as well. Practically speaking, in order for an organization or 
academic discipline to thrive during a post-Age of Reason moment, Science, writ 
large, probably loomed—and, to a majority, still looms—as the most reasonable 
choice. In fact, in arguing for physical education to be an academic discipline, 
Franklin Henry (1964) strongly advocated for the primacy of many of the sci-
ences, including exercise physiology, anatomy, psychology, physics—all applied to 
movement (read: physical education). Thinking women and men would advocate, 
if money and power and status were the main objects, aligning with a Science 
model, since so-called “provable” “facts,” both in quotations, are easily digested 
for mass consumption. By reducing complex lived experience down to component 
and hopefully salient parts, however, we collude with policy makers, among others, 
to make difficult decisions with simplistic models. We let them off the hook.
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But change sometimes actually occurs from within, and, by advocating a 
paradigm shift of sorts, I am also advocating for a preliminary and fundamental 
shift in the way that we see sport, sport studies, the academy, and other matters 
dear to our collective and individual hearts. For example, the impulse to publish 
within a 21st Century academic model rates highly the numbers of publications 
and secondarily the quality of publications. Why is that? Is it as simplistic as that 
we have become so narrowly defined that we no longer can discern quality from 
tripe? Or is it that the accountants and academic executives want simply-comparable 
statistics (which are not comparable, we all know this) so they can make simple, 
nonchallengeable decisions? Are our ways of writing and disseminating knowledge 
and understanding merely replicating a Science model of knowledge acquisition? 
Might there be other, more proactive, ways to recapture the wonder of discovery 
and the excitement of novel understandings?
Too, grants and funding opportunities—more and more the fourth prong of 
most North American academics’ “duties,” along with teaching, research, and ser-
vice—have been kinder to those in the sciences than to those in the humanities (e.g., 
Whitson & Macintosh, 1990; Michaels, 2004; Feder, 2008). One has only to witness 
the explosion of “health sciences” research in the United States and Canada, and the 
concomitant explosion of monies for such research, to corroborate the simplistic 
celebration of “evidence based” research protocols by government policy makers.
This is not just a historical phenomenon. In the European Research Council’s 
first grant competition, held in 2007, grant proposals and monies received for 
“social and human sciences” lagged far behind that given to “physical sciences and 
engineering” and “life sciences” (Feder, 2008). Whitson and Macintosh, in 1990, 
also noted that “graduate study in the new discipline of ‘human movement’ had 
first been established in the 1950s, along biomedical lines” (pp. 41–42) in Canada 
and the U.S. And, while grant monies
. . . for the humanities increased from $134-million in 1992 to $335-million 
in 2002. . . the overall share of giving for the humanities dwindled slightly 
over the decade, from 2.5 percent to 2.1 percent of total foundation dollars. 
(Michaels, 2004, p. 17)
Some of this most recent imbalance was, of course, due to a neo-liberal agenda 
emphasizing less governmental and more private monies for higher education 
concerns, but other parts of this continuing trend were due to perceptions. Percep-
tions that the humanities were still “soft”—softer even than the “soft” sciences. 
Perceptions that a Robert Mapplethorpe controversial photographic exhibition—
Robert Mapplethorpe: The Perfect Moment—was correctly viewed by Senator 
Jesse Helms as “pornographic” and “obscene” (Levinson, 1990). Perceptions that 
that which one cannot easily apprehend, digest, categorize, make sense of, locate, 
and thereby lock away as a “known Truth” is not worthy of interest—or at least of 
serious, scholarly, scientific interest.
In contrast, John Law talks about valuing the “messiness” of “social science 
research” in human realms (2004); Nigel Thrift values those affect-laden aspects 
of everyday lived life (2008); Kathleen Stewart (2005) is fascinated by the wonder 
of the “state of emergence that animates things cultural”(p. 1027). In my view, 
scholars studying sport and its related areas should be leading the discussions of 
affect, body discourse, and complex and transitory relationships.
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For the most part, however—and especially, it seems, in sociology of sport, 
which derives from both physical education and quantitative sociology—there are 
still residual traces of this 1960s dichotomous model of “soft” versus “hard” sci-
ences. In practice, the hierarchical relationship still resonates, in the 21st Century, 
even though, as Smith asserts, there is now more recognition that “our closest allies 
are not physical scientists, but rather those humanities types . . . [who] enlarge the 
social conversation and very often present us with new and different ways to think 
about lives” (2009, p. 99). The traces of this dominant model for sociology of sport 
are everywhere, but how did it come into being?
The dominant model of the sociology of sport, deriving from John Loy’s 1966 
insistence—and, with McPherson and Curtis, the 1989 reiteration—that sport itself 
was a “structured, goal-oriented, competitive, contest-based, ludic physical activity” 
(1989, p. 15), was premised on what we used to call a quasi-experimental model 
of research, itself based on basic premises of science. In fact, under “Defining 
Basic Terms,” McPherson, Curtis, & Loy (1989) situate their work solidly within 
the science model:
The concept of science has a meaning for sociologists similar to that held by 
physicists or biologists. Namely, science is the careful description of the real 
world and the construction and validation of theories about the real world. In 
principle the goals of all sciences are the same: to describe and explain through 
the testing of theories. (p. 5)
As good “scientists,” we rarely revisit the foundational premises of the establish-
ment of the sociology of sport. But we do not, after all, subject our “subjects” to 
rigorous experimental designs—and, with humans, we probably will rarely do 
such a thing. However, according to Smith (2009), “the overwhelming majority of 
social researchers [in the first part of the 20th Century] and a significant majority 
to this day were/are convinced that they are engaged in a science of the social that 
mirrors the science of the physical” (p. 93).
Politically, to align with science in the mid-1960s, particularly in the United 
States, was a savvy move. Sputnik, a perception of a “domino effect” in Vietnam, 
and sport as delivered by the Olympics had all announced the Soviet Union and the 
United States as competitors for the reaches of space exploration, world dominance, 
and cultural dominance, respectively. And, it was implied, this so-called “Cold War” 
mentality was a harbinger of the contest which presumably meant superiority of 
economic, social, and humane systems. Science—elegant and simple, measurable 
and reducible—was the Weltansicht, or zeitgeist, of the United States’ political, 
cultural, educational, and policy-making leaders, systems, and policy.
B. H. [“Before Henry”—that is, Franklin Henry (1964)], at least in North 
America, when “sociology of sport” was not a defined field of inquiry as such, the 
field of physical education had (w)holistic scholars like Jesse Feiring Williams, 
Eleanor Metheny, Celeste Ulrich, William Harper, and Donna Mae Miller musing 
about philosophical issues and body practices. Though they mostly are from dif-
ferent “generations,” the continuing connective thread tying them together was that 
they were, indeed, seeing “the body” as holistic.
For example, in Williams’ The Principles of Physical Education, first published 
in 1927 (and seeing eight editions until 1964), his application of “principles” drew 
on what he called “well-established facts” based upon the sciences, but it also looked 
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at “principles derived from philosophic concepts, [where] less stability can be given” 
(1964, p. 19). We all should know how Williams’ use of principles was applied by 
Henry in 1964 to delineate between “a profession and a trade [where] the former 
is guided by principles based upon scientific facts and/or philosophic concepts, 
while a trade is guided only by rules, methods, and directions” (Williams, p. 19).
Franklin Henry, in 1964, suggested that physical education, broadly writ, was 
a profession—and he later modified this stance to include the ideas that the profes-
sion was made up of subdisciplinary areas, much as the biological sciences were 
categorized. It was a neat and functional way of encapsulating the temper of the 
times (e.g., the various competitions between the Soviets and the Americans, the 
insistence on the infallibility of science) with the slight corrective to the arbitrary 
Cartesian duality of mind-body by claiming “physical education becomes education 
through the physical” (Williams, 1964, p. 8) not just of the physical.
But I really don’t want to talk about science, or a pseudo-scientific method. 
As with most dominant rhetorics, they have demonstrated themselves to be limit-
ing, constraining, and exclusionary. Instead, I want to talk about poetry, affect, 
wonder, and the use of a humanities-based method to imagine what our “sociology 
of sport” might look like if it hadn’t still the residual traces of this science-based 
model. Where might we be if we could rid ourselves of the scoring brought on by 
ideas tracing back to Cartesian binaries separating mind and body? In fact, where 
might our societies be? Envisioning this model is not just a philosophical exercise. 
Imagination and wonder of this sort also insist that we as a field, and area, become 
proactive, not reactive, that we become more mindful, and welcome visionaries 
who can imagine different ways of being from those we currently inhabit. This is 
akin to Ritzer’s call for “liv[ing] a more meaningful life within a society increas-
ingly defined by consumption” (1999, p. 217).
Some scholars are asking questions that are thoughtful, imaginative, and 
creative. They are using many of the tools that separate humans from other 
living beings to answer, or at least process, those questions. For example, Anne 
McCrary Sullivan has long advocated for the “poetic representation of data . . . 
to compress and render accessible the results of some kinds of research” (2004, 
p. 34). Brady (2005) sees poetry as having “special cachet” within the “heading 
of ‘artful science’ . . . because it is body grounded and can be a powerful source 
of communicating at both a sensuous and an intellectual level” (p. 1004). His 
compromise idea of “artful science” is driven by his call for a “poetics of place 
with a conscience” (p. 981).
McCrary Sullivan also calls for a merging of science and art: she sees poetry 
not as a threatening way of comprehending or apprehending the world, or as a 
class-based (and therefore exclusionary) form of “high” art,7 but more as a process 
toward deeper understanding for all: “It is intellect infused with intuitive insight 
and emotional truth. It is intellect embodied” (2004, p. 35). Poetry, like dance, long 
has been a part of human engagement with the world, as a form of understanding 
the world, both mythopoetically and realistically.
Scientists—and most of us—already think and explain complex ideas using 
metaphoric language. For example, the computer is a “brain,” the brain is a series 
of electrical or chemical connections and reactions, the Internet, in Senator Ted 
Steven’s world, is a series of tubes. (Obviously, some metaphors work better than 
others.) But, to make metaphors “work,” we need to supply details, fill in with 
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concrete examples, form connections that resonate—and that, too, is the work of 
a poetic sensibility.
I agree with McCrary Sullivan’s basic call for the use of poetry in scholarly 
research, but I would extend her arguments even further: that this use of poetry, 
and what she terms “aesthetic vision” (2000, p. 220), should not be limited to 
the “poetic representation of data.” Drawing from Caine and Caine’s review of 
research on the brain, McCrary Sullivan points out that “the human brain is hard 
wired for perceiving patterns, making meaning” (2005, p. 27). But humans also, 
I would argue, enjoy a good struggle with complex ideas, striving for patterns but 
not necessarily getting the answers right away, or sometimes ever. As poet and 
professor Terry Locke says, “. . . bringing seemingly disparate items together . . 
. making hunches . . . is at the heart of the aesthetic rage for order, of artistic or 
literary sense-making . . .” (2009).
Meaning-making, in this sense, then, can be that there is no master meaning, 
no grand narrative—though there is “sense making.” This worldview resonates 
with what postmodernism, poststructuralism, and queer theory alike advocate: 
as Giffney writes, “Queer discourses touch us, move us and leave us unsettled, 
troubled, confused” (2009, p. 9). The process of striving for this sense-making 
marks us, underscores our work, allows our sensory bodies effectively, again, to 
imagine wondrous worlds.
It may be that poetry like T. S. Eliot’s “The Waste Land” or Virginia Woolf’s 
poetic prose novel Orlando are not ever fully understood. But the reading and 
rereading of them, the poring and puzzling over their convoluted intricacies, gives 
pleasure and added layers to understandings. This concentrated focus and deep 
reading may afford insights to what it means to be alive, to live in the world at a 
particular time in a particular place, and to deeper understandings of ourselves in 
relationship to others.
When I was a graduate student, it seemed as if some questions were taboo. If 
you couldn’t get clear, definitive “data” on it, it wasn’t worth asking. So this line of 
reasoning would exclude examinations of love, pleasure, and many other abstract 
concepts that essentially define what it is to be human. I used to joke about measuring 
degrees of love on a five-point Likert scale. To me, it seems absurd because there 
are so many more interesting questions to ask, yet sport psychologists and exercise 
scientists appear continually satisfied with a perceived exertion score of 1–15.
But now, deriving from feminist, queer, performance, auto-ethnography, and 
critical theories and positions, such scholars as John Law, Nigel Thrift, Noreen 
Giffney, Sarah Ahmed, Elsbeth Probyn, Kathleen Stewart, Anne McCrary Sul-
livan, Michel Serres, and many others, are exploring not only ways of asking 
questions that were once unthinkable in the “social sciences”—those of affect and 
messiness and wonder and feeling—but also of writing their particular answers 
into being (e.g., Stewart, 2005; Hartnett & Engels, 2005; Brady, 1991, 2005; Law, 
2004; Ahmed, 1998, 2004; Probyn, 2005; Roy, 1998, 2004; Lambert, 2009; Thrift, 
2008; McCrary Sullivan, 2000, 2004, 2005; Serres, 1995a[1982]; 1995b). Some, 
like Thrift and Law, generally work theoretically, posing questions about what we 
may gain by looking at the underlying “messiness” of lives and affect; Ahmed and 
Probyn are delving deeply into emotionality and bodily experiences, informed by 
queer stances; others, like Stewart, Roy, and McCrary Sullivan, have the developed 
talent to blend theory with method with rhetorical twist.
Poetic Sensibilities  191
The Ether: Affective and Affected Bodies
On ether and the ethereal: 
“It has become helpless and irresponsible and even depraved 
in our materialist intellectual context 
to write about something so immaterial, so beyond local knowledge, 
not to mention so without disciplinary location.” 
—Joe Milutis, 2005, pp. ix–x
At the foundational, ontological and metaphysical level underpinning this poetic 
sensibility, I find John Law and Nigel Thrift’s work helpful: they both discuss the whole 
skin of existence, the sinews and heft of abstract and affective, nonlinear thinking, 
the guts and marrow of everyday moments of incompletion and process. They are 
both, in slightly different ways, caught up in coacting with, observing, and imagining 
objects and processes that are both “complex, diffuse and messy” (Law, 2004, p. 2) 
and contingencies of, in Thrift’s terms, the “art of producing a permanent supplement 
to the ordinary, a sacrament for the everyday, a hymn to the superfluous” (2008, p. 2).
Law is quite eloquent in his call for opening up significant and abstruse ways 
of understanding:
Parts of the world are caught in our ethnographies, our histories and our statis-
tics. But other parts are not, or if they are then this is because they have been 
distorted into clarity. (2004, p. 2)
He goes on to ponder how we might teach ourselves to reapprehend the world 
differently: “Perhaps we will need to know [the realities of the world] through 
the hungers, tastes, discomforts, or pains of our bodies” (p. 2). Law calls for an 
embodied “social science,” one that does not replace, but rather supplements, exist-
ing methods: one that asks new questions.
The Fire: Feminist and Queer Studies
Arundhati Roy, Elsbeth Probyn, Sarah Ahmed, and Noreen Giffney have pointed 
us to innovative explorations of the existential nature of feminist and queer theoriz-
ings. Particularly looking at issues of interiority, exteriority, and the emotions, these 
scholars have opened up new ways of knowing and of apprehending and queering 
the worldviews of researchers.
There is a terrible beauty in the way Roy writes, both her fictions and her 
“truths” (1998; 2004). She, like the Kathakali Man she describes,
. . . tells a story, [and] handles it as he would a child of his own. He teases it. 
He punishes it. He sends it up like a bubble. He wrestles it to the ground and 
lets it go again. He laughs at it because he loves it. . . . [he] is the most beauti-
ful of men. Because his body is his soul. (1998, p. 219)
Roy’s worldview sees in images, hears the world from a wondrous poetic sensibil-
ity; she story-tells like the man wrestling with ephemeral, yet tangible, bubbles. In 
her nonfiction work, Roy uses figurative language and devices to concretize that 
which is transitory and fleeting: she looks at global power relations at the moment 
of their happening, rhetorically and with profound effect.
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Elspeth Probyn’s (2005) project is to look at specific issues—in one case, 
shame, drawn from Primo Levi’s reconstitution of the Holocaust, but also with 
echoes and linkages to Michael Warner’s (1999) work on the politics of shame 
and Whitaker’s poignant chapter “Should I kill myself?” (2006). Probyn’s work 
on “the blush” is both poetic and philosophical, and her style achieves accurate 
accessibility and transgressiveness. As well, Sarah Ahmed’s work (e.g., 1998; 2004) 
focuses deeply on things both philosophical and pragmatic. While assiduously 
working to reframe the terms of arguments about postmodernism and feminism, 
for example, she has grown to engage herself with subjects in nonobjective ways. 
She states that “feminist and queer scholars have shown us that emotions ‘matter’ 
for politics; emotions show us how power shapes the very surface of bodies as well 
[as] worlds” (2004, p. 12).
Noreen Giffney writes that “Queer theory exposes in its very figuration the 
way in which discourse flattens out phenomena in an attempt to make them into 
palpable, digestible sound bites” (2009, p. 8). The woof and weave of queer theorists 
has explored, intellectually, how emotions and bodily responses resonate in and 
shape our lives, using the very precepts of this poetic sensibility.
Air and Water: Poetry and Poetic Sensibilities
We, we as humans, being half gorilla and half God, 
are not about something; we are something, 
a rather strange something, in fact, a metaphysical act, 
a venture of and into that which awaits us.
 —Miles Richardson, 1998, p. 459
But the intricate melding of form and function comes with those scholars who 
directly apply this poetic sensibility, whether in poetic form or in poesis, a poetic 
sensibility that culminates in some forms of creative nonfiction. Those of this third 
group create writings that are both bodily and interactively pleasurable, and remind 
me of Laurel Richardson’s complaint, years ago, that
. . . for 30 years, I have yawned my way through numerous supposedly exem-
plary qualitative studies. Countless numbers of texts have I abandoned half 
read, half scanned. I’ll order a new book with great anticipation . . . only to 
find the text boring. (1994, pp. 516–17)
Her solution? That writers need to see writing as a method of inquiry—and she 
recommends fresh metaphors, varied writing formats, and experimental writing 
(pp. 524–525). I think Stewart, McCrary Sullivan, Serres and others are embodying 
Richardson’s call for a more affect-laden engagement with the reader.
For me, Kathleen Stewart perhaps frames the arguments for exploring “emer-
gent things” best. In talking about her work, she says she wants to “pay attention 
to the poesis, or creativity, of ordinary things” (2005 p. 1027):
. . . the writing is also a set of provocations . . . [regarding] moments of leg-
ibility and emergence, to moments of impact. . . to models of agency that are 
far from simple or straightforward, to the vitality or animus of cultural poesis 
in the jump or surge of affect . . . and to the . . . moment when things resonate 
with potential and threat. (p. 1027)
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What a wonderful project, to delve into the moments of everyday life where things are 
admittedly uncertain and contested; where the magic of ordinary lived life is privileged 
and noticed, noted and celebrated; where meaning, relationships, and dynamics are 
demonstrated in such a way that audiences engage with others’ lived experiences.
Stewart goes on to talk about the how of her writing. She consciously separates 
herself from a linear, privileged status, and says that her writing is intended
. . . not as a trusted guide carefully laying out the perfect links between theoreti-
cal categories and the real world but rather as a subject caught in the powerful 
tension between what can be known and told and what remains obscure or 
unspeakable but is nonetheless real. (2005, p. 1028, emphasis added)
In other words, her work is neither basic knowledge, nor simply descriptive. It 
marries form and function in an artistic, creative way to approach, in written form, 
the sensory and lived experience of the transitory, often covert and unsaid moment.
Stewart writes of “. . . the streets . . . littered with cryptic, half-written signs of 
personal/public disasters. . . . Hungry. Will work for food. God bless you” (2005, 
p. 1030). Later, her poetic detail captures this clue:
A dollar bill stuck out of a car window gets a quick surge forward from the one 
with the sign and the heightened, yet unassimilated, affect of a raw contact. 
“God bless you.”
Now we are trudging the rough terrain of bodies and the sensuous accumula-
tion of impacts. (2005, p. 1031)
This kind of prosaic layering, of the sensuous engagement and empathy with one 
who is homeless, is poetic and telling, and it brings up so much to engage with: 
the universal singular nature of humanity (cf., Denzin, 1989), the complex sensual 
details of lived poverty.
In more explicit and truly poetic fashion, McCrary Sullivan (2000) has called 
for the use of poetry to represent biological knowledge for teachers and learners. 
She calls one of her poetry sets “An autobiography of attention” since, in it, she 
is representing biological “data” for teachers and learners to more closely engage 
with the stuff of marine biology. Here is part of one of her poems8:
Notes from a Marine Biologist’s Daughter
My mother . . . 
. . . digs 
for chaetopterus, yellow and orange 
worms that look like lace. 
She leads me where renilla bloom 
purple and white colonial lives, 
where brittle stars, like moss, 
cling to stone. She knows 
where the sea horse wraps its tail
and the unseen lives of plankton. (2004, p. 212)
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McCrary Sullivan weaves cycles of life with age-old concerns, and does it poetically. 
She engages the senses, tries to engage the reader or listener, seeks that they not 
only gain knowledge, but that they also unpack the poem for deeper understand-
ing. She bricolages9 details together, so that, like the underlying islands carrying 
an archipelago of ideas, the surface details compel the reader to look beneath, to 
look deeper. She also layers carefully, choosing each word after painstaking thought 
and multiple angles. As she writes, “. . . the image is the critical agent . . . [,] the 
concrete, particular detail that is important in its own right and also revelatory of 
something beyond itself” (2004, p. 35). McCrary Sullivan’s is a poetry that is at 
once poetic, informed, and informing. For example, her use of the word “colonial” 
as an adjective modifying “renilla” is an interesting commentary on how she views 
the relationships between forces of nature and human power interactions.
Michel Serres’ works, primarily his creative works Angels: A Modern Myth 
(1995b), and Genesis (1995a [1982]), are likewise filled with poetic puzzles. Writing 
in prose form, his philosophical works discuss many of the fallacies of rationalism, 
the socially-constructed natures of both chaos and order, and humans’ place within 
the “noise” that is lived life. He writes,
One writes initially through a wave of music, a groundswell that comes from 
the background noise, from the whole body, maybe, and maybe from the depths 
of the world or through the front door, or from our latest loves, carrying its 
complicated rhythm, its simple beat, its melodic line, a sweet wafting, a broken 
fall. (1995a [1982], p. 138)
Certainly this is puzzling, this complex marriage of body and gut and soul and 
disorder, his attempts at capturing the randomness and unpredictability of form. 
Serres tries to write as one feels and acts, just as stream-of-consciousness novelists 
tried to portray active thought. His work is asking new, deep, and complex ques-
tions about what it means to live and interact in a complex world, with bodies that 
are imperfect and always becoming.
But how do we enter into these worlds, if we have been trained in a modern-
ist, linear worldview that privileges objectivity, results, ends, and not subjectivity, 
carpe diem, and process?10 How do we ask the questions that are so critical to not 
only achieving deeper understanding, but also to letting the rest of the world know 
that our subject areas matter both in good and in hard times?
I might add that “this world,” like Baudrillard’s musings about ancient cartog-
raphers’ mappings of “the world” to our lived experience (1994 [1981]), is prob-
ably truer to our jumbled, dislocated, disjointed, sometimes overwhelming sensory 
experiences than the way we sometimes create sense of these experiences. We “sew” 
together our lives, write them into being, understand them in a variety of ways, and 
this very push for linearity may itself be a socially-constructed stance stemming 
from a hegemonic science model and, by extension, from a modernist worldview.
Earth: The Poetic Body
A few exemplars from sport studies may serve as models for experimental and 
courageous forms of research—for pushing boundaries, asking deep probing ques-
tions about the emergent “moment when things resonate with potential and threat” 
(Stewart, 2005, p. 1027). I have selected three I am familiar with, but of course, in 
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different ways, there are kernels of this appreciation for wonder, this knack of the 
poetic sensibility, embedded in many of our works (cf., Lambert, 2009). But they 
aren’t being published, except in “special issues,” in sport-related journals! The 
three exemplars are Katie Fitzpatrick’s unpublished poem, “Kids I used to know,” 
Synthia Sydnor’s “A History of Synchronized Swimming” (1998), and Mike Silk’s 
“Mow my Lawn” (2008).
Fitzpatrick’s unpublished poem, “Kids I used to know,” is part of her PhD 
dissertation. She describes the despair, hopes, and perceived prospects for Pacifika 
kids in a city environment—and the power relations that constrain and inscribe 
such prospects. At the risk of doing a disservice to her poem, I quote only two 
stanzas here11:
Kids I used to know
. . . Sometimes I can still see You      in my class 
writing down the content, filling pages with lines and asking 
questions 
laughing 
          thinking of getting drunk later that day
                      in the park
thinking about how your family need you to be a lawyer 
And now, I watch You working pizza, 
       spreading the toppings, taking orders 
From everyone 
I watch You in my mind holding your baby     soft and silent in the morning light, 
     rocking her asleep against your hard chest, 
smiling at her tiny fingers        waving to catch the sun 
           glad you decided to leave the gang
Fitzpatrick has, through repetition and telling detail, imagined circumscribed 
lives, reflected diminishing agency, and portrayed the hope of engagement with 
an educational system that simply does not engage with marginalized students.
Synthia Sydnor (1998) has grounded her postmodern work in divergence, while 
adhering to an aesthetic that challenges traditional sport history style and presenta-
tion. She provides a deep and idiosyncratic reading of synchronized swimming. 
In marrying form and function, she writes from a multitude of points of views, of 
multivocality, that is at once embodied and scholarly. As Sydnor writes, in a self-
aware statement on her own so-called “transgressiveness”:
. . . when I heed Benjamin [who encouraged us “to seize hold of a memory 
as it flashes up in a moment of danger”], please do not react by “policing, 
punishing, mocking, even ridiculing” (Denzin, Interpretive Ethnography, 
251) such an essay as mine as not ‘real’ history. Do not dismiss my take on 
synchronized swimming as “postmodern mumbo jumbo” (anonymous reviewer 
of one of my manuscripts, August 1995). Instead, I want the reader/listener to 
engage with me and/or many others in disparate “complex subtle arguments” 
(Norman K. Denzin, Interpretive Ethnography: Ethnographic Practices for 
the 21st Century. . .). (1998, p. 266)
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Sydnor insists on her right to seek answers to very different, affective and value-
laden issues. “A History of Synchronized Swimming” effectively anticipates Thrift, 
Law, and Stewart’s calls to examine the ethereal, the momentary, the transitory. 
Sydnor’s is a courageous stance—and make no mistake, true transgression is often 
“punished” and disciplined in various ways—especially in terms of the heavily 
science-laden status-quo of sport studies in the mid 1990s.
The first thing that strikes one about Mike Silk’s “Mow my lawn” (2008) is 
that it departs from his typically-complex scholarly style. In this creative vignette-
poem, he has tried to jolt the reader into experiencing the ugly world of xenophobia, 
misogyny, racism, and class privilege within several sports venues. The class based 
chants of “Mow my lawn” directed toward Latino/a fans of Panama’s national soccer 
team (p. 477) are juxtaposed with a discussion of a Latina woman as a sex object 
by two, presumably, non-Latino men. His method—a short exchange of performa-
tive slices—reflects well the jumbled, crazy pitch of mixed emotions surrounding 
diasporic soccer, white privilege, adolescent power plays, and how humans fight 
to retain dignity in the face of such unexamined hatred and meanness.
Toward a More E/Affective Sociology of Sport:  
A Conclusion
If, as we all seem to know cognitively, we reinvent and reinscribe our cultures 
and world at least every generation, why do we compulsively cling to old patterns 
of apprehending and presenting the world? These patterns are the ones that say, in 
hierarchical and vertically-aligned forms, that our insights are the best, that our 
arguments most persuasive. I think it is a human attempt, a human tendency or 
foible, toward “regression to the (safe, comfortable) mean.” But the key word here 
is cognitively. We have somehow conflated cognition with rationality, with linearity, 
and with the hegemony of statistics and statistical mindsets. We have been reactive, 
not proactive, in our attempts to understand—and know—the worlds we inhabit.
Yet, we also, while seeking those safe constancies of known worlds, find ourselves 
fascinated and sometimes even mesmerized by, to us, the unusual. Those things 
that pique our interest are the things that we hone in on. We pursue our hunches, 
and this confidence in our implicit knowledge, sharpened by the details we have 
learned and studied and memorized, is what makes us quasi-magical beings.
I recently viewed the film “The Diving Bell and the Butterfly.” It is a biography 
about Jean-Dominique Bauby, the former editor of Elle Magazine, who suffered 
a stroke at age 43, became totally paralyzed but intellectually sound, and could 
only communicate by means of blinking one eye. At first, it is told from the nearly-
claustrophobic narrowed lens of the camera, as if it is Bauby’s eye.
Bauby goes through very classical stages of “acceptance” of his “locked-in 
syndrome,” and soon, like a modern-day Marcel Proust, learns that his interior 
world is only constrained by his imagination. While most of us would struggle 
with inactive muscles, let alone the loss of agency from locked-in syndrome, Bauby 
painted, with a poetic sensibility, what it was to be human without many of the 
sensory inputs we usually assume as necessary. In the screenplay, based on the book 
he wrote by dictating each letter with the signal of his blinking eye stopping each 
letter in the alphabet, he claims that he can escape the confines of his prison—his 
diving bell—through an insight he has had:
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. . . I’ve only just realized that there are only two things apart from my eye that 
aren’t paralysed. . . . Imagination and memory are the only way l can escape 
my diving bell. (Harwood, 2007, p. 39)
Bauby’s sensibilities are aesthetic and poetic; his reliance upon his own inner world 
to “create” new experiences, to build upon old memories, is the stuff of wonder.
Similarly, our attempts must be, in the spirit of C. Wright Mills’ expansive call 
for shaking up our traditional comfort zones, in the spirit of Arundhati Roy’s coura-
geous identifications of specific problems that have global and ethical consequences 
and results, in the spirit of Michel Serres’ poetic and lyrical travels to the realms 
of order and disorder, to continually seek out the taboo, to gleefully transgress, to 
ask the most difficult—but profound—questions. To leave our self-imposed—and 
institutionally-sanctioned—comfort zones. It is not an overstatement to say that 
we have had the magic trained out of us.
As society and the world change and create new subtleties to old gnawing 
concerns, we too must adapt—by using our knowledge, yes, but also by using our 
understanding (cf., Denzin, 1997; Rinehart, 1998)—and creatively apply our own 
imagination and memory to profound problems that both touch on and are implicit 
within sport. We should be doing this, but many of us often don’t.
I have suggested that one of the reasons we often retreat to a safe, linear, “fact 
built upon fact” based system of analysis is because we are still ensconced in a 
scientific system where we gleefully celebrate what we know by concretizing life. 
We truly imagine—and reify—the metaphor that research is done “brick by brick.” 
This model has invaded both the sciences and the humanities for so long that it is 
considered an assumption that we rarely challenge. I believe that we, in sport studies 
broadly writ, have the opportunity to be proactive, not reactive—to have the courage 
to stretch the boundaries, to ask questions outside of the umbrella of Science, while 
still adhering to rigors that are simply different, and perhaps more humane, rhetorics.
Of course, the ages-old linear formations are fine for some questions. They 
are even fine for some answers. But a scientific laboratory is not the world. And 
fact-based knowledges, while important, are not the same as understanding. 
“Understanding” is not measurable by others, except in a results-based way. Built 
upon knowledge, understanding is expert knowledge. Understanding is knowledge 
plus wisdom; it is knowledge and, not knowledge instead of, a poetic sensibility.
This poetic sensibility is not reducible to some simple binary, such as “soft” 
versus “hard,” or the “sciences” versus the “humanities.” But its impact upon 
decision-making, upon the discordant social disparities that create inequitable 
conditions, cannot be overestimated: understanding, related to empathy, demystifies 
the “other” in ways that are a beginning to problem-solving. In addition, a poetic 
sensibility allows one to see the world creatively and cooperatively, so that those 
with it seek solutions in concert with others, not the control of others.
We live in the world, the world of messy ideas and ideologies, of competing 
power bases and structures, of pleasure and unfairness, hostility and kindness. We 
live in a world that, try as we might, does not provide the crystal-clear, clarifying 
moment of eureka, but instead is often confusing, embattled, and contested.
We will no doubt get complex, muddy, messy answers, but we will have been 
brave enough to move the quest for new knowledges and understandings, for new 
and more equitable ways of being, along their admittedly-contested paths. And for 
those of us who think that this is not our battle: it is. We inherit the world we invent.
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Notes
1. Though this paper was intended firstly for a sociology of sport audience, I think the points 
made also apply to the field of kinesiology, broadly-writ. Thus, I encourage readers to make con-
nections, as McCrary Sullivan (e.g., 2004, 2005) has, between this “poetic sensibility” and their 
subdiscipline.
2. And even humanities-based discussions—let’s say subjectivity itself—are constantly being 
disciplined and constrained by the dominance of the science model in research, everyday lived 
life, intellectuality, and understandings (cf., Heshusius, 1994).
3. I am indebted to my colleague Deborah Fraser for pointing out McCrary Sullivan’s work.
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4. I am grateful to my friend and colleague Paul Whitinui, who brought Heshusius to my 
attention.
5. Lous Heshusius (1994), in particular, has written eloquently of what she terms “a participa-
tory mode of consciousness”; I use the term “empathy” to describe a similar “like-feeling” for 
other beings—Heshusius uses the term “selfother” (p. 17) for this kind of merging.
6. Thanks to Richard Pringle for directing me to Deleuze and Guattari’s works.
7. Thanks to Jayne Caudwell for this point, and for many critical readings of the manuscript.
8. McCrary Sullivan’s whole poem is below:
Notes from a Marine Biologist’s Daughter
My mother loves the salty mud of estuaries, 
has no need of charts to know what time 
low tide will come. She lives
by an arithmetic of moon, 
calculates emergences of mud, 
waits for all that crawls there, lays eggs, 
buries itself in the shallow edges 
of streamlets and pools. She digs 
for chaetopterus, yellow and orange 
worms that look like lace. 
She leads me where renilla bloom 
purple and white colonial lives, 
where brittle stars, like moss, 
cling to stone. She knows 
where the sea horse wraps its tail 
and the unseen lives of plankton. 
My mother walks and sinks into an ooze, 
centuries of organisms ground 
to pasty darkness. The sun 
burns at her shoulders 
in its slow passage across the sky. 
Light waves like pincers 
in her mud-dark hair. (2004, p. 212)
9. The term bricolage has many meanings in a postmodern, poststructuralist, moment. However, 
for my purposes, I intend it to draw from the artistic, sociological and philosophical traditions 
that imply its natures: both reflexive and empowered, complex and multilayered, drawing from 
multiple traditions, “thick” (c.f., Geertz, 1973), and performative and political (c.f., Denzin, 2003, 
p. 240).
10. There is an interesting parallel here to how much of western sport is results-driven, how 
subjectively-scored sports are diminished in so many ways in the popular imaginary, and, of course, 
how this all relates to the problems of masculinised sport, institutions, and contemporary society.
11. Fitzpatrick’s poem (unpublished, permission from the author) in full:
Kids I used to know
Looking out my window I can see You 
    joining the navy line up with a salute, 
            you’re waving at your dad, 
proud and tough smiling 
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In the night I can see You 
    distressed and 17 you hang 
           in a garage 
                         and your mother wails  
        (At the funeral your friend tells me he was thinking of the 
same 
         but after this he’s changed his mind) 
I can see You, entering the shop now, 
          with a knife, 
      just trying to get enough money for the next round of 
Everything 
Sometimes I can still see You in my class 
 writing down the content, filling pages with lines and asking 
questions 
laughing 
           thinking of getting drunk later that day 
                        in the park 
thinking about how your family need you to be a lawyer 
And now, I watch You working pizza, 
       spreading the toppings, taking orders 
From everyone 
I watch You in my mind holding your baby      soft and silent in the 
morning light, 
     rocking her asleep against your hard chest, 
smiling at her tiny fingers        waving to catch the sun 
           glad you decided to leave the gang 
Looking out my window I can see You, 
  hips swinging your lavalava in the music 
          hands curled and poised 
towards tomorrow
